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Negotiated disciplines on export credits in agriculture are intended to (1) eliminate any 
subsidy element caused by preferential financing or low fees and (2) provide special 
and differential treatment for developing countries. Inconsistent foundations of these 
two objectives limit the potential for negotiations on the disciplines to succeed. The 
subsidy element cannot be eliminated without agreement on the benchmark. 
Eliminating all advantage relative to private institutions precludes any reason to 
continue government support. Favourable financing to developing countries would 
introduce a prohibited subsidy. In their capacity to provide special and differential 
treatment, export credits fall well short of the requirements for food aid. 
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Introduction 
fficially supported export credits, more simply and commonly called export 
credits, are government-supported programs that provide financing assistance to 
countries that import products from the country providing the support.
1 Export credits 
may take the form of direct financing or interest-rate subsidies, or they may be 
guarantees or insurance. Export credits that help importers access financing may 
provide a reduction in the total cost the importers pay for the traded goods. If present, 
this cost reduction would amount to an export subsidy in some sense. Support for 
financing of developing countries may help them to import food that otherwise would 
be unavailable to them. 
These two possibilities are reflected in multilateral negotiations. One objective of 
the negotiations of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) at the World Trade 
Organization with regard to agricultural policy is the elimination of export subsidies, 
explicitly including the subsidy element of export credits. At the same time, another 
objective of these negotiations is to provide special and differential treatment for 
developing countries, including for poor countries that use export credits to facilitate 
their trade in agricultural products.  
These objectives are considered here with a view to highlighting their 
inconsistency relative to each other and to other elements of the institutions governing 
support for trade. This article is related to the work of other authors, whose research is 
summarized below, but goes further by identifying inconsistencies that, if unresolved, 
undermine the ability of any negotiated result to meet effectively the stated objectives 
of the DDA. 
Literature 
esearch on agricultural export credits can be divided into roughly two themes. 
One theme considers the effects of these programs, typically by applying net 
present value calculations. Dahl et al. (1995) estimate a range of subsidy in U.S. 
export credit programs to selected importers from about 1 percent to 12 percent, if the 
cost reduction is expressed as a percentage of the value of exports financed. For an 
overlapping subset of U.S. export credits, Dierson et al. (1997) estimate a range from 
0 percent to 11 percent. Hyberg et al. (1995) provide averages for U.S. export credits 
over time that are less than 1 percent at the lowest but as high as 7 percent in some 
years. The broadest study in terms of number of exporters and importers is provided 
by the OECD (2000), which estimates an overall average subsidy of less than 4 
percent for all exporters studied, and less than 7 percent for the United States. Dahl, 
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Wilson, and Gustafson (1995) use option pricing to estimate a range from 12 percent 
to 20 percent for the effects of export credits provided by Canada, France, Australia, 
and the United States to an importer. Rude and Gervais (forthcoming) provide a very 
different type of analysis: a highly stylized model is used to investigate the market 
effects of export credits in the case that the importer suffers a narrowly defined 
liquidity constraint, but this model does not lead to quantitative estimates. This body 
of research into the effects of export credits is tangentially relevant to the present 
study. 
The second thrust of past literature on agricultural export credits focuses on the 
export credit negotiations at the WTO in order to assess their likelihood of success. 
Goodloe (2004) notes the overlap of state trading exporters and export credits. Benitah 
(2005) explores the logic of the WTO cotton ruling, which extended Uruguay Round 
export subsidy disciplines to export credits. Often, authors recommend certain 
positions by way of conclusions. Rude (2000) foresees little political will to discipline 
completely export credits, but he argues that the existing disciplines on industrial 
goods should nevertheless be applied to agricultural export credits provided they do 
not interfere with the ability of export credits to ease liquidity constraints. Abbott and 
Young (2003) note the inconsistency of disciplines that govern all conditions of 
private financing transactions with the broader objective of liberalizing markets. Thus, 
to prevent the loss of the possible assistance to developing-country importers only to 
eliminate what have been very small export credit subsidies, these authors recommend 
against imposing disciplines. Hoekman and Messerlin (2005) largely proceed along 
the lines of this last argument as well, but propose that the use of these programs at 
least be monitored by an international observer.  
Abbott and Young, Rude, and Hoekman and Messerlin acknowledge implicitly if 
not explicitly the conflicting objectives of eliminating the subsidy element and 
providing special and differential treatment. However, there are further inconsistencies 
in the objectives of the WTO negotiations. These inconsistencies, which are 
illuminated in the text that follows, constrain the effectiveness of any agreement if 
measured by its ability to achieve all objectives. 
Negotiations 
he widespread belief when the DDA negotiations began was that export credits 
had not been addressed directly during the Uruguay Round (UR) Agreement, at 
which time signatory countries agreed to clear limits on direct export subsidies. In 
contrast, UR text referencing further negotiations on export credits in a different 
forum, implicitly under the auspices of Participants to the Arrangement on Officially 
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Supported Export Credits, was widely seen to exempt these programs. The 
Arrangement is an agreement among the countries accounting for most of global 
exports to discipline their export credits in other sectors through rules on the terms 
and conditions of credits, including a requirement of budget neutrality. Because 
agricultural export credits were and remain exempt from the Arrangement, many 
perceived there to be little or no constraint to the use of export credits. This view was 
not universal. A WTO panel and the Appellate Body, in ruling on the challenge Brazil 
brought against several aspects of U.S. agricultural policies relating to cotton, 
including U.S. export credit programs, judged that the UR commitments to restrain 
direct export subsidies apply to export credits. 
The application of export subsidy disciplines to export credits notwithstanding, 
negotiators perceive there to be cause for negotiated disciplines on export credits. 
There may be cause to clarify what does and what does not constitute a subsidizing 
export credit and also to ensure the elimination of the subsidy element in light of the 
stated objectives of participating countries. For example, the cotton case demonstrates 
that a requirement that export credits be neutral with respect to the government 
budget, costing no more in support to financing than they receive in the form of 
repayments and fees, is ambiguous in application.
2 Thus, DDA negotiations seek to 
identify disciplines for these programs that define and prohibit practices that create a 
subsidy element. These considerations are reflected in the attempt on the part of the 
Chair of the Committee of Agriculture to set out a framework for negotiations, a draft 
text, in summer 2006 (WTO, 2006). 
Subsidy Elimination 
Two mechanisms are proposed to eliminate the subsidy element of these programs. 
One mechanism of the disciplines on export credits in draft DDA text would limit the 
conditions or terms of the guarantees, direct financing, or other practices of granting 
agencies. The value of an export credit would be constrained in the event that there 
was a maximum period, a minimum interest rate in the event of direct financing, a 
maximum percentage guaranteed in the event of a guarantee or insurance, a fee or 
premium that reflects risk, and so on (see Rude for a hypothetical application of the 
disciplines of the Arrangement to export credits in agriculture).  
Negotiations to discipline export credits propose budget neutrality or self-
financing requirements as a second mechanism for disciplining these programs. 
Perhaps it was recognition of the difficulty of assessing the success of the range of 
restrictions on export credit practices, in terms of data collection and processing, that 
led negotiators to seek as well a second, largely separate constraint to eliminate the 
subsidy element. In any case, the restrictions on the budget are intended to force the   W. Thompson 
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agencies that provide export credits to fund themselves out of the fees and repayments 
of their activities. The basis is presumably the expectation that a program that is 
budget neutral does not subsidize. 
Special and Differential Treatment  
Negotiations also take into account the mandate to provide special and differential 
treatment for developing countries.
3 Two cases should be differentiated: the case 
where the importer has a liquidity constraint and the case without a liquidity 
constraint.
4 
Recommendations of previous authors have centred on the potential for export 
credits to provide special and differential treatment in the form of access to liquidity 
for developing countries that would not otherwise have any, or would have only 
limited, ability to import. Abbott and Young argue that, in light of the low level of 
subsidy estimated based on net present value calculations, the potential for export 
credits to alleviate liquidity constraints must be present to explain some part of the 
popularity of these programs. Rude and Gervais assess the effects of liquidity 
constraints on export credit use and on commodity markets based on a highly stylized 
model but also note that this is likely not the common case.  
The absence of notification or other publicly available data about global export 
credit use requires using secondary sources or data that only incompletely represent 
export credit practices. These data indicate that liquidity constraints are not prevalent 
among importers who receive export credits. From 1995 to 1998, 8.9 percent of export 
credits were granted to net-food-importing developing countries and 0.2 percent to 
least-developed countries, whereas about 60 percent were given to OECD importers 
(OECD, 2000).
5 The share of U.S. export credits provided to net-food-importing 
developing countries was higher than average, at 17.3 percent, but the share provided 
to least-developed countries was approximately zero (OECD, 2000). Moreover, 
stating the presence of these importers should not be taken as an assertion that all 
these countries of either type suffer liquidity constraints in all years covered by those 
data. Publicly available data about U.S. export credits indicate that the vast majority 
of export credits provided are used to support only a portion of the corresponding 
bilateral trade flow of agricultural products to any given importer; U.S. export credits 
were applied to more than half of the bilateral trade flow (by value) in 14 percent of 
the instances from 1998 to 2005 in which any export credits were granted, and to 
more than 90 percent of the bilateral trade flow in only six cases.
6 If trade occurs 
contemporaneously without export credits, then there may be purchases without 
support. In conclusion, while there may be instances of liquidity constraints, 
circumstantial evidence indicates that they are likely to be the exceptions.   W. Thompson 
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The second case of special and differential treatment for importers, in which there 
is no liquidity constraint, is consequently expected to be the more common one. In 
those cases where export credits have been granted to countries that do not suffer a 
liquidity constraint, the importers have presumably benefited from the subsidy 
element by importing at lower cost – just as recipients of direct export subsidies 
benefit. 
Unresolved Inconsistencies 
1. Competing exporter benchmark versus private market 
benchmark 
The draft text does not make clear the benchmark against which the subsidy element 
is defined. The stated goal of eliminating the subsidy element of export credit 
programs may not be as unambiguous as casual observers would expect. The 
definition of the subsidy element may be largely agreed among authors of various 
estimates in applied economic literature, but the definition in the context of the WTO 
may differ. In fact, bracketed text of one draft agreement expressly precludes a key 
technique used in past present value calculations to estimate the subsidy element of 
export credits, indicating a malcontent among some negotiators with a comparison to 
estimated market interest rates.
7 
What is the benchmark of comparison? Does permitting all potentially competing 
exporters to access the same conditions eliminate the subsidy element of any one 
program? The purposes of the Arrangement are “to provide a framework for the 
orderly use of officially supported export credits” and, furthermore, “to foster a level 
playing field for official support … in order to encourage competition among 
exporters based on quality and price of goods and services exported rather than on the 
most favorable officially supported financial terms and conditions” (OECD 2005, Art. 
1). What constitutes “orderly use”? And is “the level playing field for official support” 
to be level among those exporters who use such programs or level among all exporters 
including those who are not party to the Arrangement and do not use export credits? 
The draft text does not specify the notification data. Even if notification data were 
specified, they might only suffice to police behavior of export credit agencies relative 
to one another and to any disciplines. These data alone would not suffice to test for 
success of the disciplines relative to a private market benchmark that will not be found 
in export credit agency data. The omission of notification requirements may reflect the 
underlying inconsistency: one view may be that notification data for cross-program 
comparisons suffice whereas the opposing view may be that these data are incomplete 
for measurement relative to private market practices.   W. Thompson 
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The definition of the budget of an export credit program represents a critical 
omission that may reflect this inconsistency as well. One element of the proposals to 
eliminate the subsidy element takes the form of requirements for budget neutrality or 
self-financing, but the method of budget calculation is ambiguous. Nevertheless, the 
draft DDA agreement of mid-2006 goes no further than observing that such a 
definition is needed. If the benchmark is the private sector rather than competing 
programs, then the budget of an agency for administrative purposes may not be 
relevant; if the benchmark of comparison is the private market, then the requisite 
budget neutrality of the activities of the export credit agency may not eliminate its 
potential to offer better conditions than private financial institutions. The export credit 
agency could provide export credits that pay for its financing activity alone, but no 
more, in the event that staff and office rental costs were omitted from its budget and 
costs incurred for regulatory compliance or insurance by a private institution were not 
paid by the public agency. Private financial institutions would charge higher rates to 
cover all their operating expenses in addition to the expected costs of the credits 
themselves. Thus, if the benchmark is to be the private sector, budget neutrality must 
be defined very broadly to be inclusive of all operating costs and, even so, must be 
supplemented by any costs incurred by private institutions that are not also paid by 
public agencies.
8 
2. Subsidy element elimination versus credit elimination 
If the subsidy element relative to private trade is to be eliminated, then what role 
remains for export credits? If the benchmark against which export credits are judged is 
the private market, rather than simply their ability to out-compete other potentially 
subsidizing export credit programs, then successful disciplines in whatever form 
would render government export credits equivalent to those offered by private 
institutions.
9 If this is the intention of the negotiations, then what purpose would 
export credits serve if this objective were accomplished? 
This line of argument raises broader questions about the purpose of export credits 
that have been addressed in the broader literature about export credits for industrial 
products. For example, Baron (1983) notes the scope for export credits to address 
capital market imperfections or failures and capital market deficiencies, which are 
subjectively defined, as well as other objectives of public policy. In terms of 
imperfections, there may be the possibility that the export credits could cover political 
or systemic risk in agricultural export credits that the private market would not 
address, if any exists. Eaton (1983) cautions against citing the absence of any activity 
by private financial institutions as evidence of market imperfections: “Although 
absence of active private competition is evidence of a subsidy element, it is not   W. Thompson 
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evidence that private markets would be unwilling to provide the services …” (p 116). 
Eaton also discusses the possibility that the exporting country government could coax 
repayment from an importer who does not fear ostracism in credit markets as one 
potential justification for export credits. Even if one of these arguments proves true 
and is accepted as good cause for the program, the special ability of the export credit 
agency to overcome market failures or to withstand such risks would represent an 
advantage over private competitors and, consequently, would not withstand 
comparison to a private market benchmark. 
3. Subsidy elimination versus special and differential 
treatment 
If the subsidy element is eliminated relative to private financing, then how can special 
and differential treatment be provided? Or, conversely, if the special and differential 
treatment offered poor countries is worth having, then how can the subsidy element be 
maintained? It is not clear how best to meet conflicting goals of eliminating the 
subsidy element and subsidizing the purchases of some selected importers, as noted by 
Abbott and Young, Rude, and Hoekman and Messerlin.  
The draft text proposes exemptions for developing countries. But the conditions 
under which exemptions apply – and who declares that these conditions are met – are 
not points of agreement.
10 In any case, an exemption amounts to perpetuating the 
subsidy element, which, even if the cause is widely applauded, undermines the 
objective of eliminating that element. The underlying tension arises from conflicting 
goals to (1) eliminate a means of subsidizing exports for commercial gain and (2) 
establish a mechanism for aid to developing countries, without any clear agreement 
about how to separate these two objectives in the context of export credits. 
4. Export credits versus food aid 
If special and differential treatment is provided by means of export credits, then why 
not apply the Food Aid Convention requirements for food aid to export credits? The 
argument that export credits represent a form of aid for developing countries is 
received by several authors with skepticism. Baron (1983) considers “back-door aid in 
the form of concessionary export financing … inappropriate” (p 80). Eaton (1988) and 
the OECD (2000) question the wisdom of providing to poor countries with bad 
finances support in the form of more lending.  
Even if the justification for export credits based on their potential to provide 
special and differential treatment for developing countries is accepted, what limited 
evidence is available indicates potential is not realized. Liquidity constraints may be 
present in a minority of cases historically: most export credits do not go to the   W. Thompson 
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countries that seem most likely to face liquidity constraints and, in the case of the 
United States, usually less than half of bilateral trade to any export credit recipient is 
facilitated with export credits. In the majority of cases, then, the subsidy element is a 
relevant estimate of the benefit to importers, and these estimates are very low. Subsidy 
elements average 3.6 percent according to one estimate (OECD, 2000) and, according 
to others, range no higher than 11 percent (Dierson et al., 1997), 12 percent (Dahl et 
al., 1995), or 20 percent (Dahl, Wilson, and Gustafson, 1995). In light of the low rates 
of subsidy and the few instances of liquidity constraints among recipients in historical 
use of these policies, it may be difficult to see what special and differential treatment 
export credits provide that outright export subsidies do not.  
In contrast, the Food Aid Convention mandates an average concessionality of 80 
percent, and signatory parties are to strive towards 100 percent.
11 Moreover, food aid 
is subject to disciplines that seek to prevent commercial trade displacement. In the 
event that export credits are intended to facilitate developing-country imports, then the 
underlying logic of food aid rules is presumably applicable. Yet there seems to be no 
consequence for current negotiations: draft agreements do not make clear how 
disciplines on export credits would gravitate towards food aid disciplines in the event 
that the justification for permitting these programs is a claim that they facilitate poor 
countries’ imports. 
Conclusion 
Negotiations relating to export credits in agriculture exhibit no fundamental 
agreement on what constitutes an ideal outcome of any consequent disciplines. 
Instead, the following inconsistencies between conflicting objectives are left 
unaddressed.  
•  Is the benchmark of comparison when judging what constitutes subsidy 
elimination (1) harmony of practices among competing export credit programs 
or (2) financing available from private institutions?  
•  If a private market benchmark is accepted and all subsidy relative to that 
benchmark is to be eliminated, then what scope remains for useful 
government involvement in export credits?  
•  If a private market benchmark is used, then how can meaningful special and 
differential treatment be provided without undermining the objective of 
eliminating the subsidy element? Conversely, how can the subsidy element 
relative to a private market benchmark be eliminated if poor importing 
countries are to benefit from these programs?   W. Thompson 
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•  If special and differential treatment is an objective of export credits, then why 
are not the mechanisms and goals established in the context of food aid the 
basis of export credit disciplines?  
The purpose of negotiations is to find grounds for compromise, not to reconcile 
differing policy goals, but some elements of negotiation are points along a scale, such 
as the decision of the pace for eliminating all direct export subsidies, the minimum 
level of concessionality of food aid, or the magnitude of reductions in bound rates of 
domestic support or import barriers. As the text above indicates, however, negotiations 
on export credits may not be reduced to arguing over a point on a scale or, at least, not 
until the scale is identified. A compromise can be envisioned in the contest to 
eliminate the subsidy element without identifying either a private market or competing 
exporter benchmark. A compromise is less apparent when considering whether or not 
such programs should exist if set to a private market benchmark and even less so 
without knowing whether the fundamental purpose of export credits is or is not to 
facilitate meaningfully, or perhaps even exclusively, poor countries’ imports. These 
differences are manifested by bracketed paragraphs in, and important omissions from, 
draft agreements that negotiators may be hard-pressed to bridge when participating 
parties seem not yet to agree on the chasm to be bridged. 
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1.   Export credits are also provided by private financial institutions without 
government support. Where private arrangements are discussed in this article, the 
word “private” will be used. 
2.   The Appellate Body agreed with the panel to abdicate the responsibility to set out 
a single, precise budget test: “In these circumstances, we agree with the Panel 
that, in this particular case, it was not necessary to choose a particular method nor 
determine the precise amount by which long-term operating costs and losses 
exceeded premiums” (paragraph 672). 
3.   Proposals for the DDA calling for special and differential treatment for exporting 
developing countries are not addressed here.  
4.   The definition of a liquidity constraint is the inability to access credit at all, at any 
rate. Alternative definitions of a liquidity constraint exist: the importer faces 
borrowing costs that are too expensive or the importer pays too much interest. 
Definitions of liquidity constraint that are based on a subjective assessment of 
high – or unfair – borrowing costs are not appropriate in this context, although 
high financing charges doubtlessly do discourage imports on credit. Likewise, the 
need to forego other important purchases in order to afford food imports or the 
need to export more to pay for imports, while potentially troubling for reasons of 
equity, do not by themselves provide evidence of a liquidity constraint. 
5.   The confidential data from which these shares are drawn include a certain number 
of export credits, accounting for 0.6 percent to 9.4 percent of the total value, the 
recipients of which are not identified (OECD, 2000, p. 23). 
6.   The values of export credits allocated by importers are from the website of the 
Foreign Agricultural Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(http://www.fas.usda.gov/excredits/ecgp.asp). Total agricultural export data are 
from Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/FATUS/). The comparison is over fiscal year data. 
The portion of bilateral trade flows not subject to export credits may be supported 
by an alternative export competition policy, such as U.S. food aid.   W. Thompson 
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7.   The draft DDA agreement circulated in mid-2006 included a bracketed paragraph 
that would prohibit calculation methods based on estimated discount rates by 
requiring that any comparison with market conditions be based on a commercial 
loan that is identical in every detail to the export credit (WTO 2006, Annex I 
paragraph 4.i). 
8.   There are other hurdles, such as debt written off and the time value of money, 
which must be overcome regardless of the benchmark. 
9.   This is not to say that there would be no possible effects. Sumner (1995) expects a 
negative effect on national income. Rude (2000), for example, emphasizes the 
potential for export credits to be used as part of a policy of price discrimination in 
export markets. However, these effects are not to be broached as justifications 
during multilateral DDA negotiations to liberalize trade. Additionality, if defined 
as a net effect that is positive owing to the ability of export credits to enable more 
purchases by importers who would not otherwise be able to purchase, might be 
relevant, although the same historical evidence that argues against frequent 
liquidity constraints among recipients also argues against additionality. Moreover, 
the definition of additionality is ambiguous. Regardless of the potential for 
additionality, by whatever definition, the argument of the text remains valid: if 
export credits are not permitted to provide any different terms than private 
financial arrangements, then they cannot cause additionality relative to whatever 
private agents can achieve. 
10.  As noted above, bracketed text relating to special and differential treatment for 
exporting developing countries is not addressed here. 
11.  Concessionality is calculated on a net present value basis, but from the 
perspective of the exporting country, so it is not equivalent to the subsidy element 
estimates noted earlier. In either case, however, exports with a 100 percent 
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